Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

10-20-2005

Summary of Bennett v. Dist. Ct., 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 78
Collin Webster
Nevada Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Webster, Collin, "Summary of Bennett v. Dist. Ct., 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 78" (2005). Nevada Supreme Court
Summaries. 760.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/760

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Bennett v. Dist. Ct., 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 78 (2005)1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE—WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Summary:
This was an original petition for a writ of mandamus in a death penalty case regarding the
State’s filing of an amended notice, alleging additional aggravating circumstances. Petitioner
requested that the Court intervene in proceedings regarding the district court’s application of a
previous holding.
Disposition/Outcome:
Petition granted. The State’s amended notice, alleging additional aggravating
circumstances is invalid and the additional aggravating circumstances contained therein must be
stricken. In addition, two of the previous aggravating circumstances are invalid and must be
stricken.
Factual and Procedural History:
On July 7, 1988, the State filed a notice of aggravating circumstances against Bennett.
Bennett was subsequently convicted of multiple crimes, including first-degree murder with the
use of a deadly weapon, attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and attempted
robbery with the use of a deadly weapon.
Although Bennett was sentence to death, his penalty was vacated, and the court ordered a
new penalty hearing.2 At that time, three of the State’s original aggravating circumstances
remained: (1) the murder created a great risk of death to more than one person, pursuant to NRS
200.033(3); (1) Bennett committed the murder during a burglary, pursuant to NRS 200.033(4);
and (3) Bennett committed the murder while attempting a robbery, pursuant to NRS 200.033(4).
On December 29, 2004, before Bennett’s second penalty hearing, the Court decided
McConnell v. State.3 In McConnell, the Court held it was unconstitutional to obtain a death
sentence by convicting a defendant under a theory of first-degree felony murder, and then
predicating an aggravating circumstance pursuant to NRS 200.033(4) on that underlying felony.
On December 30, 2004, Bennett filed a motion arguing that the second and third
aggravating circumstances, based on robbery and burglary, were duplicative and should be
eliminated. On January 13, 2005, the State moved the court to file an amended notice, alleging
additional aggravating circumstances. Admitting that the McConnell opinion “eliminated two of
the aggravators originally found by a jury against this defendant (murder in the course of a
1
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burglary and murder in the course of a robbery),” the State sought to add three new aggravating
circumstances.
The district court granted Bennett’s motion, which argued that the aggravators were
duplicative. Yet the district court also held that the McConnell opinion provided the State with
good cause to file an amended notice alleging additional aggravating circumstances, pursuant to
SCR 250(4)(d). However, the district court only partially granted the State’s motion, since one
of the newly alleged aggravating circumstances was unsupported by evidence. Therefore, the
district court struck two of the aggravating circumstances which were pending before
McConnell, regarding murder during robbery and burglary. However, the district court allowed
the State to amend the notice to allege two new aggravating circumstances.
Discussion:
Application of McConnell to Petitioner’s Case
Despite the State’s arguments to the contrary, the McConnell holding clearly applies to
the Bennett case. In its answer, the State asserted: “This Court’s opinion denying rehearing in
McConnell … has since rendered the State’s action of removing the two felony-murder
aggravators unnecessary since Defendant’s conviction has been final since 1990 and McConnell
does not apply.”
The State’s argument is insufficient because Bennett’s conviction is not yet final. A
conviction becomes final when judgment is entered, the availability of appeal has been
exhausted, and a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court has been denied or the time for
such a petition has expired.4 Because Bennett’s death sentence was vacated, and a new penalty
hearing was ordered, the finality of the Bennett’s case was not absolute. Thus, Bennett’s
conviction is not yet final, and McConnell applies.
The State’s second argument is that there was no specific finding that Bennett was found
guilty solely on a theory of felony-murder. The State claims that because it is unclear whether
the conviction was solely based on this theory, it is not clear whether McConnell applies.
McConnell does not require the conviction to be based solely on the felony-murder
theory. If the conviction is based “in whole or part on felony murder…the State will have to
prove an aggravator other than one based on the felony murder’s predicate felony.”5 Thus, as
long as the conviction was obtained in part on felony murder, McConnell applies. Moreover,
contrary to the State’s assertions, the original indictment appears to base the first-degree murder
solely on the felony-murder theory, and makes no allegations that the murder was premeditated
or deliberate.
Because Bennett’s judgment is not yet final, and it appears the State based the conviction
at least in part on the felony murder theory, McConnell applies to the current matter.
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Consequently, the two previous aggravating circumstances, regarding burglary and robbery,
were constitutionally infirm and properly stricken
Good Cause Pursuant to SCR 250(4)(d)
In addition to determining whether McConnell applies to Bennett’s case, it is necessary
for the Court to examine whether the issuance of McConnell provided the State with good cause
pursuant to SCR 250(4)(d) to file an amended notice alleging additional aggravating
circumstances. The Court concludes that it did not, and that the State’s new allegations were
improper.
SCR 250(4)(d) provides:
Upon a showing of good cause, the district court may grant a motion
to file a late notice of intent to seek the death penalty or of an
amended notice alleging additional aggravating circumstances. The
State must file the motion within 15 days after learning of the
grounds for the notice or amended notice. If the court grants the
motion, it shall also permit the defense to have a reasonable
continuance to prepare to meet the allegations of the notice or
amended notice. The court shall not permit the filing of the initial
notice of intent to seek the death penalty later than 30 days before
trial is set to commence.6
SCR250(4)(d) essentially has two prongs. The first prong requires the State to file the
motion within 15 days after learning of the need for such an amendment. In this case, the State
argued that the issuance of the McConnell decision was the basis for its motion to amend. The
McConnell decision was issued on December 29, 2004, and the State’s motion was filed January
13, 2005, exactly15 days after the decision was issued. Thus, the State satisfied the first prong
by timely filing a motion to amend.
The second prong requires the State to file the motion with “good cause.” The Court
concludes that the mere issuance of an opinion by the Court, by itself, is not sufficient “good
cause” for the State to file an amended notice, alleging additional aggravating circumstances.
Good cause requires something more.
State v. District Court (Marshall)7 is the only previous case in which the Court addressed
the good-cause provision of SCR 250(4)((d). In Marshall, although the Court did not set out a
definitive explanation of “good cause,” it concluded that good cause is not satisfied merely
because “a defendant would not suffer any prejudice from the filing of a late notice.”8 In
considering whether good cause was shown, the court held that good cause contemplates the
discovery of previously unknown evidence regarding aggravating circumstances. However,
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there is not sufficient good cause when it is based on “mere oversight on the part of a
prosecutor.”9
In the current case, the State’s evidence for the newly alleged aggravating circumstances
was not previously undiscovered. Rather, the State knew of the evidence since Bennett’s
original prosecution in 1988. This, along with the Court’s decision that the issuance of an
opinion alone does not constitute good cause, persuades the Court to hold that the State has not
shown sufficient “good cause” for filing an amended notice.
Conclusion:
The Court grants Bennett’s petition. Because the McConnell holding applies to the
current matter, two of the original aggravating circumstances, regarding robbery and burglary,
are invalid and must be stricken. Furthermore, the McConnell holding did not provide the State
with “good cause” to file an amended notice, adding additional aggravating circumstances.
Therefore, The State’s amended notice, alleging additional aggravating circumstances, is invalid,
and the additional aggravating circumstances contained therein must be stricken.
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